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Abstract
This paper investigates labor supply and redistributive effects of in-work benefits for
Italian married couples using a tax-benefit microsimulation model and a multi-sectoral
discrete choice model of labor supply. We consider in-work benefits based on the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the Working Tax Credit (WTC) existing in the US
and the UK, respectively. The standard design of these income support mechanisms is
however augmented with a premium for two-earner households to avoid potential
disincentive effects on secondary earners. Revenue neutral policy simulations show that
our reforms may greatly improve the current Italian tax-benefit system in terms of both
incentive and redistributive effects. Furthermore, neglecting sector-specific attributes
of the various job opportunities may lead to overstated estimates of the policy effects.
JEL classification: I38; H31; H53
Keywords: In-work benefits; Sectoral labor supply; Poverty; Microsimulation;
Married couples
1 Introduction
In-work benefits are usually promoted as income support mechanisms that encour-
age employment in the low-skilled population while maintaining high levels of social
protection. This twofold objective is achieved by providing means-tested transfers to
low-income households with eligibility conditional on some employment requirement.
Pioneering in-work benefit schemes are the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the US
and the Working Tax Credit (WTC) in the UK, but similar policies have been recently
implemented in a number of OECD countries.
Despite the general consensus on effectiveness of these welfare instruments for lone
parents, the design of in-work benefits for married couples is still muddied by important
concerns. Economic theory and previous empirical evidence suggest that family-based
schemes, where the benefit is means-tested against household income, generally pro-
mote employment among primary household earners (Bargain and Orsini 2006; Blundell
2000; Blundell and Hoynes 2004; Eissa and Hoynes 2004; Eissa and Liebman 1996). Such
schemes are likely to create, however, negative labor supply effects on secondary earners
as their earnings maymove households in regions of the budget set with highmarginal tax
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rates (Eissa and Hoynes 2004). To contrast these unintended disincentive effects, some
countries have experienced individual-based schemes where the benefit is means-tested
against individual income (Immervoll and Pearson 2009). In this case, however, the major
concern is a less efficient targeting of redistributive effects since transfers may also be
provided to low-income workers in well-off households. Whether labor supply incentives
and redistributive effects can be reconciled into a single welfare instrument is still an
open issue.
This paper contributes to the literature on in-work benefits by proposing an inno-
vative design of EITC and WTC schemes for married couples aimed to overcome
potential disincentive effects on secondary earners. Our strategy consists of introducing
a new benefit premium for two-earner households within otherwise standard family-
based schemes that preserve an efficient targeting of redistributive effects towards
poor working households. Effectiveness of the resulting in-work benefit schemes is
assessed by means of policy simulations on the 2008 Italian welfare system using a
national tax-benefit calculator and a structural model of labor supply. Unlike most
of the previous studies using a similar policy evaluation approach, our structural
model of labor supply draws upon the multi-sectoral discrete choice framework by
Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) that jointly accounts for nonlinear and nonconvex bud-
get sets, hourly wage differentials among jobs of different sectors, prediction errors in
the hourly wages, observed and unobserved heterogeneity, and sector-specific quan-
tity constraints. The original setup of the multi-sectoral model for a single decision
maker is also extended, within a unitary framework, to the case of two decision makers
to capture labor supply responses of both spouses. Further, we assess the implica-
tions of using alternative model specifications by comparing our multi-sectoral model
with a simpler benchmark that ignores sector-specific attributes of the various job
opportunities.
Differently from earlier ex-ante evaluations of in-work benefits for Italy (Colonna
and Marcassa 2011; Figari 2011), our policy simulations focus on EITC and WTC
in-work benefits for Italian married couples with a special emphasis on the new ben-
efit premium for two-earner households. Policy reforms are simulated under budget
neutrality by considering the abolition of Italian family allowances (FA). We find that
in-work benefits with a suitable set of incentives for secondary earners may have
strong positive effects on labor supply of wives and equity. The EITC is more effec-
tive than the WTC in boosting employment of wives, while the WTC is more effec-
tive than the EITC in fighting poverty. Most labor supply responses take place in
the private sector where there is a greater availability of job opportunities and lower
hourly wages with respect to the public sector. Moreover, neglecting sector-specific
attributes of the various job opportunities may lead to overstated estimates of the policy
effects.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of
the EITC in the US and the WTC in the UK. Section 3 describes the Italian FA program
and formalizes the EITC and WTC schemes simulated in our study. Section 4 describes
the key ingredients of our evaluation tool including the tax-benefit calculator and the
structural model of labor supply. Estimates of the labor supply model and wage elasticities
are presented in Section 5, while policy simulations are presented in Section 6. Finally,
Section 7 concludes.
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2 In-work benefits in the US and the UK
In-work benefits in the US and the UK have been discussed and compared in several stud-
ies, including Dickert et al. (1995), Eissa and Liebman (1996), Liebman (1998), Blundell
(2000), Brewer (2000), Blundell et al. (2000), Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001), Neumark
andWascher (2001), Blundell et al. (2002), Blundell and Hoynes (2004), Eissa and Hoynes
(2004), Brewer et al. (2006), Francesconi and van der Klaauw (2007), Leigh (2007), Gregg
et al. (2009), Brewer et al. (2010), and Blundell and Shephard (2012), among others. In this
section, we briefly review the design of these income support mechanisms to emphasize
their disincentives on secondary earners.
2.1 Design of the EITC andWTC programs
A common feature of the EITC in the US and the WTC in the UK is that low-income
households are entitled to a refundable tax credit (or benefit) provided that at least one
adult member works and other eligibility criteria are satisfied.
To be eligible for the EITC, the taxpayer needs to meet two conditions: (i) positive
earned income from employment or self-employment, and (ii) earned income, adjusted
gross income and investment income below certain thresholds. Conditional on eligibility,
the credit entitlement depends on family earned income according to separate schedules
by filing status and number of eligible children. Each schedule includes a phase-in region
where the credit is initially increased at a certain subsidy rate, a flat region where the
credit is kept constant at the maximum amount, and a phase-out region where the credit
is tapered away to zero. Subsidy rate, maximum credit amount, and taper rate vary with
the number of eligible children leading to a more generous welfare program in favor of
large households1.
To be eligible for the WTC, the claimant needs to work a minimum number of hours
per week and fulfil other conditions related to either age, disability, responsibility for chil-
dren or previous periods of unemployment benefits. The credit entitlement is equal to its
maximum amount if gross annual income (jointly assessed in the case of couples) does not
exceed a fixed disregard and is reduced at a certain taper rate above it. Compared to the
EITC, an important difference is the lack of a phase-in region. Moreover, if the claimant
works 30 hours or more per week, the maximum credit entitlement is shifted upward by
the 30 hour element of the WTC schedule2.
2.2 Disincentives on secondary earners
The key insight from both economic theory and earlier empirical evaluations is that
family-based in-work benefits like EITC and WTC are effective for some population
groups like lone-parents and primary earners of married couples, but they lead to per-
verse effects on secondary earners of married couples whose labor supply decisions are
known to be sensitive to financial incentives from the tax-benefit system. Despite its
importance, this issue has received little attention compared with other problems such as
the role of childcare, the problem of benefit take-up and stigma effects, and the evaluation
of possible spillover effects with other parts of tax-benefit system. The use of family-
based in-work benefits with extra credits for secondary earners has been recommended
by Brewer et al. (2010) based on implications from the optimal taxation theory. To our
knowledge, however, formalized policy designs and simulation results for the impact of
such reforms are still lacking.
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Notice that in the UK and the US, the focus on lone parents may be partly justified by
the large share of two-earner households with children. In Italy, however, this population
group amounts to 45% due to the low labormarket participation ofmarried women. Thus,
potential disincentives on secondary earners must be considered a more serious concern
than in the US and the UK.
3 Policy reforms
Our policy reform consists of replacing the Italian FA program with a new system of
in-work benefits, the size of which is adjusted to achieve budget neutrality. To avoid
potential disincentives on married women, we propose an innovative design of the EITC
and WTC which includes a suitable scheme of financial incentives for secondary earn-
ers of low-income households. A description of the FA program to be abolished is given
in Section 3.1, while the EITC and WTC reforms are formalized in Sections 3.2 and 3.3
respectively.
3.1 The Italian FA program
The FA program provides family-based benefits that are exempt from taxation and
means-tested against the number of eligible household members, household composition
and gross household income. Its schedule distinguishes among 15 household groups, but
our attention shall be focused on four groups only consisting of married couples with no
disabled member and (i) no children, (ii) one child, (iii) two children, and (iv) three chil-
dren, respectively. Eligibility is restricted to employees, temporary workers, unemployed
covered by unemployment benefits, and former-employee pensioners. Self-employed are
not eligible since at least 70% of gross household income is required to be from wages,
salaries, and former-employee pensions. As shown in Figure 1, FA are strictly increasing
with household size and non-increasing with gross household income. With the excep-
tion of childless couples, each household group faces an initial flat region of maximum
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Figure 1 The 2008 Italian family allowances by household type. Notes: Benefit amounts and gross
household income are expressed in 1000 Euros.
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benefits and three subsequent phase-out regions. Although it is usually considered a wel-
fare program to alleviate poverty, FA expire at rather generous income cut-off points
(about 90th percentile of the gross income distribution for households with children). As
discussed below, our in-work benefit reforms impose lower income cut-off points to col-
lect resources from the right-hand-side of the household income distribution and then
use these resources to finance a set of additional incentives for two-earner households
with low income.
3.2 The EITC reform
Our EITC reform grants a benefit exemption from taxation which is means-tested against
gross household income and household size. Eligibility is restricted to households with
positive earnings, and policy coefficients are determined to ensure tax revenue neutrality
for each household group after accounting for the abolition of FA. In this way, we anchor
the budget of each household group to the amount available in the FA program. The
schedule for one-earner households has the standard form
Ec = E∗c − max{0,min{E∗c , t1c (G1c − G)}}
−max{0,min{E∗c , t2c(G − G2c)}}, c = 1, 2, 3, 4,
where E∗c is the maximum benefit of the flat region, t1c = E∗c /G1c is the subsidy rate of
the phase-in region, t2c = E∗c /(G3c − G2c) is the taper rate of the phase-out region, Gtc,
t = 1, 2, 3, are the income cut-off points, and G is gross household income. The schedule
for two-earner households presents two differences. First, there is a higher maximum
benefit E¯∗c = (1+pc)E∗c , where pc ≥ 0 is the benefit premium for two-earner households.
Second, there are larger phase-in and phase-out regions to avoid that the benefit expires
as secondary earners enter the labor market.
Imposing that length of the flat region, subsidy rate and taper rate do not change,
the income cut-off points of the schedule for two-earner households are equal to
G¯1c = (1 + pc)G1c, G¯2c = G2c + pc G1c and G¯3c = (1 + pc)G3c − pc (G2c − G1c).
Figure 2 focuses on households with one and two children to illustrate FA and two dif-
ferent EITC schedules against gross earnings of the secondary earner, with gross earnings
of the primary earner fixed to 15,000 Euros. The two EITC schedules differ only in the
size of the benefit premium for two-earner households, which is fixed to pc = 0 in the
standard schedule and pc = 1 in the new schedule. In both schedules, the income cut-off
points G1c,G2c, and G3c are fixed to 50%, 100% and 150% of the poverty line in the base-
line tax-benefit system and vary across household groups according to coefficients of the
Carbonaro equivalence scale. As noticed above, the benefits from the two EITC schedules
expire at lower income cut-off points with respect to FA, and the new EITC schedule has a
larger phase-out region than the standard EITC schedule. One-earner households receive
higher benefits under the standard EITC schedule. However, as the second-earner enters
the labor market, the new EITC schedule provides considerably higher benefits over a
wider range of the gross earnings distribution.
3.3 TheWTC reform
In the WTC reform, eligibility is restricted to households with at least one adult person
working 16 hours per week or more. The maximum benefit entitlement is made up by
three components: the basic elementW ∗1c, the second adult elementW ∗2c and the 30 hour
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Figure 2 EITC and FA against gross earnings of the secondary earner for households with one and
two children. Notes: Benefit amounts and gross earnings of the secondary earner are in 1000 Euros. Gross
earnings of the primary earner is fixed to 15,000 Euros. The benefit premium for two-earner households is
pc = 0 in the standard EITC schedule and pc = 1 in the new EITC schedule.
elementW ∗3c. We assume thatW ∗1c is provided to all eligible households,W ∗2c is provided
to households where both spouses work at least 16 hours per week, andW ∗3c is provided
to households where both spouses work at least 30 hours per week. As before, the basic
element W ∗1c is determined to achieve budget neutrality within each household group.
The other two elements are instead fixed to W ∗2c = pc W ∗1c and W ∗3c = qc W ∗1c, where
pc ≥ 0 is the benefit premium for two-earner households, and qc ≥ 0 is the benefit
premium for working full-time. The schedule for one-earner households has the standard
form
Wc = W ∗c − max
{
0,min
{
W ∗c , tc(G − G2c)
}}
, c = 1, 2, 3, 4,
where W ∗c = W ∗1c is the maximum benefit of the flat region, tc = W ∗c /(G3c − G2c) is
the taper rate of the phase-out region, and G2c and G3c are the income cut-off points
delimiting the phase-out region. Here, the first income cut-off point of the flat region is
defined implicitly by the eligibility condition placed on hours of work, and it varies across
households according to hourly wages of both spouses and non-labor household income.
Two-earner households who are entitled to the second adult element face a similar sched-
ule with maximum benefit W¯ ∗c = W ∗1c + W ∗2c, income cut-off points G¯2c = G2c and
G¯3c = G3c + pc (G3c −G2c). If both spouses work full-time, then the maximum benefit is
shifted upward to W˜ ∗c = W ∗1c + W ∗2c + W ∗3c, and the income cut-off points are increased
to G˜2c = G2c and G˜3c = G3c + (pc + qc) (G3c − G2c). Thus, two-earner households are
entitled to a higher maximum benefit and face a larger phase-out region.
Figure 3 illustrates FA and two different WTC schedules against gross earnings of the
secondary earner for households with one and two children. For comparability with the
EITC schedules illustrated in Figure 2, common policy coefficients are set as before, and
the benefit premium for full-time work is fixed at qc = 0.5 for all household groups.
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Figure 3 WTC and FA against gross earnings of the secondary earner for households with one and
two children. Notes: Benefit amounts and gross earnings of the secondary earner are in 1000 Euros. Gross
earnings of the primary earner is fixed to 15,000 Euros for a full-time job, and gross hourly wage of secondary
earner is fixed to 6 Euros. The benefit premium for two-earner households is pc = 0 in the standard WTC
schedule and pc = 1 in the new WTC schedule. The benefit premium for working full-time is qc = .50.
Compared to the EITC, this system of in-work benefits is particularly targeted to house-
holds with low hourly wages. Further, it provides additional incentives to encourage
full-time work.
4 Evaluationmethodology
Themethodology used to provide an ex-ante evaluation of the hypothetical in-work bene-
fit reforms consists of combining a national tax-benefit calculator with a behavioral model
of labor supply using data from the Survey on Household Income andWealth (SHIW). In
what follows, we describe the key ingredients of this evaluation tool.
4.1 Tax-benefit calculator and survey data
The tax-benefit calculator used in this study is EconLav, an Italianmicrosimulationmodel
that covers social security contributions, taxes and public transfers. EconLav is applied
to a subsample of married couples from the 2008 wave of the SHIW to approximate
the budget sets of each sample unit under both the baseline tax-benefit schedule in the
year of data collection and the hypothetical schedules resulting from our in-work benefit
reforms. Our working sample consists of 1,926 married couples in which the husband and
the wife are both aged between 20 and 65 years, and neither of them is disabled, retired,
in education, nor engaged in self-employment activities. We also trimmed 1% of outliers
from the observed hourly wage distribution of each spouse. Descriptive statistics on the
key variables are presented in the Additional file 1.
4.2 Behavioral model of labor supply
For the behavioral model of labor supply, we extend to married couples the multi-sectoral
discrete choice model for single decision makers developed by Dagsvik and Strøm (2006).
2014, 3:23
http://www.izajolp.com/content/3/1/23
De Luca et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy Page 8 of 24
Like other models based on a discrete choice approach, labor supply is treated as the
outcome of agents’ choices from a finite set of job opportunities. Thus, utility maximiza-
tion is performed by finding the best alternative in this finite set, and it becomes simple
handling nonlinear and nonconvex budget sets while also accounting for other impor-
tant issues faced in the estimation of labor supply models (e.g. flexible specifications of
preferences, observed and unobserved heterogeneity, unobserved wages, and quantity
constraints on the choice set).
The multi-sectoral framework of Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) extends the standard setup
for this class of models by accommodating the separation of jobs in different sectors.
Within this framework, each job is characterized by fixed hours of work, a sector-specific
hourly wage, and other nonpecuniary and unobservable job attributes. Thus, the hourly
wage of each agent can vary across jobs of different sectors, and the set of available jobs
is allowed to be individual-specific to capture quantity constraints that are determined
by market equilibrium conditions and negotiations between unions and employers within
each sector.
Our generalization of this framework to married couples is presented in Appendix A.
A key assumption of this model is that it relies on a unitary approach where husband
and wife maximize a common household utility function. As argued by Chiappori and
Donni (2009); Vermeulen (2002); and Bargain et al. (2010), the income pooling assump-
tion made in this approach is not exempt from criticisms, and it has been rejected in
some empirical studies. A more attractive approach would be a collective model where
the two spouses are involved in an intra-household bargaining process to maximize their
own preferences (see, for example, Vermeulen 2006 and Francesconi et al. 2009). Earlier
studies by Beninger et al. (2006); Beninger et al. (2007); Beninger and Laisney (2002); and
Chiuri and Longobardi (2002), among others, suggest that imposing a unitary framework
when the data-generating process is a collective framework may lead to downward biased
estimates of labor supply responses for wives and upward biased estimates of labor sup-
ply responses for husbands. In this paper, we shall not follow this more general approach
because full estimation of a collective and multi-sectoral labor supply model with taxes
like ours has not been achieved yet.
In the empirical analysis, we focus on a two-sector model that distinguishes between
jobs in the public and private sectors to capture the non-negligible differences existing in
the labor market conditions and the hourly wage structures of these two sectors in the
Italian economy (see, for example, Giordano et al. 2011). The predetermined choice set
of each agent includes non-participation plus 6 job opportunities for each sector, yielding
169 job combinations for each couple. In modeling quantity constraints on the choice set,
we assume that the number of sector-specific jobs available for each spouse depends on
education and regional unemployment rates. Further, we assume that their hours of work
distributions are uniform apart from two peaks at full-time jobs with 35 and 40 weekly
hours of work, respectively, and one peak at part-time jobs with 20 − 30 weekly hours of
work.
The hourly wage of each agent is allowed to vary among jobs in the public and private
sectors but not across jobs within the same sector. This amounts to assuming that hourly
wages are independent from hours of work. Since sector-specific hourly wages of the
two spouses can never be observed jointly, we estimate a system of four hourly wage
equations in an early stage. As described in Appendix B, this estimation stage is based on a
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three-step control function procedure that simultaneously accounts for sector-specific
selection effects, endogeneity of experience, and correlations among hourly wages of the
husband and the wife.
In addition to the bias correction terms that control for selection in each equation of
the system and the reduced form residuals that control for endogeneity of experience, the
covariates in the hourly wage equations include a third-order polynomial in experience,
two indicators for education attainment, gender-specific regional unemployment rates,
and two indicators for living in the center and the south of Italy. Identification of the
hourly wage equations is attained through a set of exclusion restrictions: second-order
polynomials in age and non-labor income, number of children, and indicators for children
aged less than 3 years and occupational status of the parents. In other words, we assume
that this set of variables help explain the reduced form equation for experience and the
selection equations for the choice of the sector, but not the sector-specific hourly wages of
the two spouses. Hourly wage predictions also incorporate prediction errors drawn from
a multivariate normal distribution with zero means and a variance-covariance matrix
equal to the estimates resulting from our three-step procedure.
The utility function includes a systematic component, which takes the form of a
quadratic polynomial expansion in disposable household income, leisure of the husband
and leisure of the wife, and a random taste-shifter which is identically and indepen-
dently distributed across households, sectors and jobs according to an extreme value
distribution.
Preference variation across couples is taken into account by modeling the marginal
utility of each spouse’s leisure in terms of a second-order polynomial in age, number of
children, an indicator for children aged less than 3 years, and a random error for unob-
served heterogeneity in preferences. The random errors for unobserved heterogeneity in
the preferences of husbands and wives are assumed to be mutually independent, indepen-
dent of prediction errors in the hourly wages, and normally distributed with mean zero
and constant variance.
Due to the distributional assumption on the random taste-shifter, the reduced form of
the model is equivalent to a multinomial mixed logit model with 169 alternatives and six
random errors, two of which account for unobserved heterogeneity in preferences of the
two spouses, and four account for prediction errors in their sector-specific hourly wages.
Model parameters are estimated via simulated maximum likelihood (SML) to integrate
out of the likelihood these unobservable random errors. Provided that the number of
draws used in SML goes to infinity faster than the square root of the number of observa-
tions, the resulting estimator is known to asymptotically equivalent to the exactmaximum
likelihood estimator (Hajivassiliou and Ruud 1994).
4.3 Labor supply predictions
The SML estimates of our model can be used to predict potential adjustments in labor
supply due to changes in the tax-benefit system. In our analysis, these predictions are
computed through the procedure of Creedy and Duncan (2002). For each couple, we first
draw up to 750 realizations from the extreme value distribution and the estimated asymp-
totic distribution of the parameter estimates, such that under the baseline tax-benefit
system, the observed alternative in the choice set has the highest utility. This gives us one
set of draws of the random taste-shifter and the parameters estimates which rationalizes
2014, 3:23
http://www.izajolp.com/content/3/1/23
De Luca et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy Page 10 of 24
the observed labor supply choices of the two spouses under the baseline tax-benefit
system. Only for couples where none of the 750 realizations yields maximum utility at
the observed alternative, labor supply of the two spouses is considered to be invariant.
Through repeated applications of this process, we construct 250 sets of draws for all ran-
dom components of the model, and for each of them we predict labor supply choices
of the two spouses under a reform scenario to obtain 250 predictions of labor supply
transitions. Finally, we average over the sample and report the mean and the fifth and
ninety-fifth percentiles of the distribution of transitions. These percentiles are the bounds
of a two sided confidence interval of about 90 percent.
5 Estimates of the labor supply model and elasticities
Table 1 compares the SML estimates of our two-sector model (labeled as Model 2) with
those of a benchmark model (labeled as Model 1) which ignores sector-specific attributes
of the jobs offered to the two spouses. The SML estimates of both models are based on 50
draws from the distribution of their unobservable random errors.
The estimated coefficients of the terms of the utility function are reported in the upper
panel of the table. These estimates suggest that differences betweenModels 1 and 2 in the
coefficients of disposable household income and leisure terms are non negligible. Never-
theless, both models satisfy the first and the second order conditions in van Soest (1995),
implying that the deterministic parts of the corresponding utility functions are increasing
in their arguments and quasi-concave for all sample observations. Here, a positive coef-
ficient of the interactions between leisure terms and socio-demographic characteristics
can be interpreted as a positive effect on the marginal utility of leisure or, equivalently, as
a negative effect on labor supply. Accordingly, we find that labor supply has an inverted
U-shaped age profile with a maximum at 38 years for husbands and 33 years for wives.
The number of children has a negative impact on wives’ labor supply, while the presence
of young children has negligible effects. Similarly to Haan (2006), we also find that ran-
dom effects for unobservable heterogeneity in the preferences do not play an important
role.
Estimated peaks of the hours of work densities suggest that working opportunities are
mainly concentrated around full-time jobs with 40 hours of work. The availability of part-
time jobs and full-time jobs with 35 hours of work is particularly low for husbands in the
private sector, and one can also notice that estimated peaks from Model 1 are always in
the range of their sector-specific estimates from Model 2. Estimated coefficients of the
job availability measures imply that couples living in regions with high unemployment
rates face a less favorable labormarket environment.Moreover, except for husbands in the
private sector, the number of jobs offered to the two spouses is positively related to educa-
tion. Overall, both models fit the observed data very well, and their estimated coefficients
are found to be robust to alternative specifications of the predetermined choice-sets for
the two spouses.
To investigate the sensitivity of labor supply responses to financial incentives, we
present in Table 2 the own and cross wage elasticities of the participation probability (PP)
and the unconditional hours of work (HW). These elasticities are computed numerically
by simulation using a procedure similar to that discussed in Section 4.3. Specifically, for
each household, we first obtain 250 labor supply transitions in response to a 10% exoge-
nous increase in all gross hourly wages of husbands or wives, leaving the tax-benefit
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Table 1 SML estimates of labor supply models for married couples
Model component Variable Model 1 Model 2
Preferences (DHI/1000) 0.9413** 0.3513**
(DHI/1000)2 -0.0045** -0.0012**
(Husband’s leisure)2 -0.0019** -0.0016**
(Wife’s leisure) 2 -0.0025** -0.0026**
(DHI/1000) × (Husband’s leisure) -0.0009 0.0007
(DHI/1000) × (Wife’s leisure) -0.0028** -0.0008
(Husband’s leisure) × (Wife’s leisure) 0.0007 0.0009**
(Husband’s leisure) 0.5268** 0.4080**
× (Age/10) -0.0560 -0.0555*
× (Age/10)2 0.0075* 0.0073**
× No. children 0.0030 0.0029
× Children aged (0–3) -0.0111 -0.0124
Standard deviation ζm 0.0027 0.0020
(Wife’s leisure) 0.7348** 0.6520**
× (Age/10) -0.0504 -0.0391
× (Age/10)2 0.0078* 0.0060*
× No. children 0.0105** 0.0079**
× Children aged (0–3) 0.0094 0.0092
Standard deviation ζf 0.0048 0.0004
Hours of work densities Husband Part-time peak -3.1684**
Full-time peak-35h -1.1088**
Full-time peak-40h 0.4886**
Wife Part-time peak -1.2054
Full-time peak-35h -0.1112
Full-time peak-40h 1.1022*
Husband - public Part-time peak -2.2099**
Full-time peak-35h 0.4483
Full-time peak-40h 0.7350**
Husband - private Part-time peak -3.4112**
Full-time peak-35h -1.8509**
Full-time peak-40h 0.4425**
Wife - public Part-time peak -0.3702
Full-time peak-35h 1.0504
Full-time peak-40h 1.3263*
Wife - private Part-time peak -1.6869*
Full-time peak-35h -0.9976
Full-time peak-40h 0.9908 *
Job availabilitymeasures Husband Constant 2.7391**
Secondary educ. 0.8766**
Tertiary educ. 1.2449
Reg. unemployment -0.1241**
Wife Constant 2.1139**
Secondary educ. 0.9326**
Tertiary educ. 1.8226**
Reg. unemployment -0.2159**
Husband - public Constant -2.4705*
Secondary educ. 1.8531**
Tertiary educ. 3.2211**
Reg. unemployment 0.0497
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Table 1 SML estimates of labor supply models for married couples (Continued)
Husband - private Constant 3.1858**
Secondary educ. 0.2602
Tertiary educ. -0.7316
Reg. unemployment -0.1553**
Wife - public Constant -1.8995**
Secondary educ. 1.6213**
Tertiary educ. 3.2079**
Reg. unemployment -0.1088**
Wife - private Constant 2.1173**
Secondary educ. 0.4084*
Tertiary educ. -0.1426
Reg. unemployment -0.1625**
Notes: Model 1 ignores sector-specific attributes of the various jobs, while Model 2 distinguishes between jobs in the public
and the private sectors. SML estimates are based on 50 draws from the distribution of the random effects in each model. DHI
denotes disposable household income. ζm , and ζ f are random effects for heterogeneity in preferences of husbands and
wives, respectively. Asterisks denote *a p-value between 5% and 1% and **a p-value below 1%.
system unchanged. These transitions are constructed using the same sets of draws of
the random taste-shifter, and the parameter estimates for which the observed alternative
of each couple has maximum utility before increasing the gross hourly wages. We then
aggregate over the sample to obtain the relative change in the means of PP and HW
and multiply the resulting figures by 10 to obtain the so-called aggregate wage elastic-
ities. Finally, we compute the mean and the 90 percent confidence interval (CI) from
the distribution of aggregated wage elasticities. Notice that these elasticities depend on
the distribution of the initial gross hourly wages, individuals characteristics, and the
baseline tax-benefit system. Own-wage elasticities refer to increases of the own gross
hourly wages, while cross-wage elasticities refer to increases of the spouses’ gross hourly
wages.
Coherently with earlier studies, we find that the own-wage elasticities from both mod-
els are considerably higher for wives than for husbands, are decreasing across deciles of
the disposable household income distribution, and are mainly driven by changes at the
extensive margin of labor supply. Specifically, the own-wage elasticities of PP are equal to
0.13 (CI from 0.09 to 0.18) for husbands and 0.58 (CI from 0.47 to 0.69) for wives, whereas
the own-wage elasticities of HW are equal to 0.18 (CI from 0.13 to 0.23) and 0.70 (CI
from 0.58 to 0.83), respectively. The cross-wage elasticities are negative and much smaller
in absolute value than own-wage elasticities, and differences in the wage elasticities from
Models 1 and 2 are generally negligible.
6 Simulation of EITC andWTC reforms
As discussed in Section 3, our policy reforms involve substituting the Italian FA program
with an in-work benefit program based on either the EITC or the WTC. The simulations
are organized as follows. First, we consider an intermediate policy reform that abolishes
the FA program without introducing other income support mechanisms to disentangle
howmuch of the overall policy effects comes from abolishing the existing FA program and
howmuch comes from introducing the new in-work benefit programs. Second, we inves-
tigate effectiveness of the proposed policy reforms by focusing on a simulation design
where the benefit premium for two-earner households is fixed to pc = 1. Other things
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Table 2 Labor supply elasticities of husbands andwives with respect to gross hourly wages
by decile of disposable household income
Own elasticity Cross elasticity
Model Outcome Spouse Decile Baseline Mean Q5 Q95 Mean Q5 Q95
1 PP Husband I-III 84.26 0.45 0.33 0.60 0.01 -0.06 0.08
IV-VII 96.76 0.06 0.01 0.11 -0.03 -0.07 0.01
VIII-X 98.44 0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.04 -0.09 0.00
Total 93.51 0.15 0.11 0.19 -0.02 -0.05 0.01
Wife I-III 12.28 3.95 2.68 5.21 0.14 -0.56 0.99
IV-VII 60.31 0.49 0.34 0.65 -0.08 -0.22 0.04
VIII-X 84.58 0.14 0.06 0.20 -0.14 -0.25 -0.04
Total 53.17 0.56 0.43 0.68 -0.09 -0.22 0.02
HW Husband I-III 32.40 0.52 0.38 0.69 0.03 -0.07 0.12
IV-VII 38.36 0.09 0.04 0.14 -0.04 -0.08 0.01
VIII-X 39.58 0.01 -0.03 0.05 -0.06 -0.14 -0.02
Total 36.94 0.18 0.13 0.23 -0.03 -0.07 0.00
Wife I-III 3.50 4.83 3.36 6.25 0.18 -0.59 1.11
IV-VII 19.48 0.59 0.42 0.77 -0.11 -0.24 0.03
VIII-X 28.47 0.17 0.07 0.26 -0.17 -0.31 -0.06
Total 17.38 0.64 0.50 0.77 -0.12 -0.26 -0.00
2 PP Husband I-III 84.26 0.38 0.25 0.51 0.01 -0.06 0.08
IV-VII 96.76 0.06 0.03 0.11 -0.03 -0.08 0.00
VIII-X 98.44 0.02 0.00 0.04 -0.04 -0.09 0.00
Total 93.51 0.13 0.09 0.18 -0.02 -0.05 0.01
Wife I-III 12.28 3.94 2.82 5.07 0.53 -0.14 1.27
IV-VII 60.31 0.51 0.34 0.69 -0.02 -0.13 0.09
VIII-X 84.58 0.16 0.08 0.25 -0.05 -0.14 0.02
Total 53.17 0.58 0.47 0.69 0.00 -0.10 0.10
HW Husband I-III 32.40 0.46 0.33 0.61 0.03 -0.05 0.12
IV-VII 38.36 0.10 0.04 0.15 -0.04 -0.09 0.01
VIII-X 39.58 0.04 0.01 0.09 -0.06 -0.12 -0.01
Total 36.94 0.18 0.13 0.23 -0.03 -0.06 0.01
Wife I-III 3.50 4.88 3.48 6.47 0.65 -0.20 1.46
IV-VII 19.48 0.63 0.46 0.84 -0.03 -0.15 0.08
VIII-X 28.47 0.24 0.14 0.35 -0.07 -0.17 0.01
Total 17.38 0.70 0.58 0.83 -0.01 -0.11 0.10
Notes: Elasticities are computed, increasing the gross hourly wages of all jobs by 10%. PP and HW denote the participation
probability (in percentage points) and the unconditional hours of work per week, respectively.Q5 andQ95 denote the fifth
and ninety-fifth percentiles, respectively, so that (Q5,Q95) is a two sided confidence interval of 90 percent.
being equal, this design implies that two-earner households are entitled to a double maxi-
mum benefit with respect to one-earner households. Finally, we explore the importance of
this policy coefficient by considering four alternative EITC and WTC schedules, with pc
ranging from 0 to 1.5 with step 0.5. In all simulations, the size of the corresponding EITC
andWTC programs is always determined to ensure budget neutrality for each household
group.
As predicted by the economic theory, the results of our intermediate policy reform
confirm that a family-based welfare scheme like the Italian FA program unambiguously
reduces labor supply of secondary earners (these results are not presented for the sake of
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brevity). If this program is abolished, then the PP of wives increases by 1.05 percentage
points (from 53.17% to 54.22%) and their HWby 0.4 hours per week (from 17.38 to 17.78).
The effects on labor supply of primary earners are instead ambiguous. The PP of husbands
decreases by 0.51 percentage points, but the variation in HW is not statistically different
from zero at the 10% level. Of course, labor supply effects represent only one face of the
coin. Although FA unambiguously contribute to the low participation rate of Italian mar-
ried women, one cannot ignore the sizeable redistributive effects induced by this welfare
program. Its abolition would lead to a reduction of mean disposable household income
(DHI) by 1.38% (from 30, 087AC to 29, 670AC) and to an increase in the poverty gap ratio
(PGR) by 1 percentage point (from 4.83% to 5.84%). Surprising, the effect on the poverty
head count ratio (HCR) is positive only for households with children and not statistically
different from zero3.
Tables 3 and 4 present the labor supply effects of the EITC and WTC reforms with
pc = 1 by model specification, household type, decile of disposable household income
and sector. Labor supply effects for wives are positive and mainly concentrated at the
extensive margin, while labor supply effects for husbands are negligible. According to
Model 2, the PP of wives increases from 53.17% to 55.82% (CI from 55.14% to 56.44%)
under the EITC reform and to 55.07% (CI from 54.52% to 55.66%) under theWTC reform.
Notice that, although these effects partly reflect the abolition of FA, the net contribution
of our EITC and WTC reforms on the PP of wives remains sizeable. The EITC seems
to be more effective than the WTC in boosting employment of wives. However, after
accounting for labor supply responses at the intensive margin, the labor supply effects
of the two reforms are not statistically different due to the WTC benefit premium for
working full-time. The HW of wives vary from 17.38 hours per week to 18.07 hours (CI
from 17.88 to 18.25) under the EITC reform and to 17.91 hours (CI from 17.73 to 18.09)
under the WTC reform.
Heterogeneity of labor supply responses across population groups seems to be sub-
stantial. The effects of both reforms are strongly increasing with household size and
decreasing with disposable household income. Under the EITC (WTC) reform, the vari-
ation in the PP of wives ranges from a minimum of 0.59 percentage points for childless
couples to a maximum of 7.92 percentage points for couples with three children. Since
our reforms are calibrated to ensure no financial transfer across household groups, and
differences in the underlying labor supply elasticities are negligible, this positive gradient
is likely to reflect the greater generosity of FA in favor of large households. The negative
gradient with respect to disposable household income reflects instead two effects: the
decreasing labor supply elasticities across income deciles and the redistributive nature
of our reforms that imposes lower income cut-off points with respect to the FA pro-
gram (see Figures 2 and 3). As a consequence, most labor supply responses are found
at the bottom of the disposable household income distribution where the PP of wives
increases from 12.28% to 16.64% under the EITC reform and to 15.55% under the WTC
reform.
Models 1 and 2 lead to qualitatively similar policy considerations, but differences in the
magnitude of their policy effects are non negligible. Specifically, the benchmark model
that ignores sector-specific attributes of the various jobs (Model 1) leads to higher labor
supply effects than those obtained from our two-sector model (Model 2). The most strik-
ing discrepancies are found in the PP of wives, especially those living in large households
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Table 3 Effects of EITC andWTC reforms on participation probabilities of husbands and
wives bymodel specification, household type, decile of disposable household income and
sector
EITC WTC
Model Spouse Variable Baseline Mean Q5 Q95 Mean Q5 Q95
1 Husbands 0 children 93.43 93.57 93.43 93.82 93.58 93.43 93.82
1 child 94.25 94.50 94.08 94.92 94.65 94.25 95.09
2 children 93.83 93.56 92.98 94.04 93.81 93.62 94.04
3 children 88.46 87.83 86.54 88.46 88.53 87.50 89.42
I-III 84.26 84.19 83.56 84.78 84.60 84.26 84.95
IV-VII 96.76 96.89 96.63 97.28 96.96 96.76 97.28
VIII-X 98.44 98.44 98.44 98.44 98.42 98.27 98.44
Total 93.51 93.54 93.30 93.77 93.69 93.56 93.87
Wives 0 children 54.27 55.22 54.66 55.85 54.77 54.40 55.32
1 child 55.67 59.20 58.04 60.41 58.36 57.19 59.56
2 children 51.70 58.62 57.02 60.43 57.91 56.17 59.57
3 children 37.50 46.82 42.31 51.92 46.89 42.31 51.92
I-III 12.28 18.23 16.44 20.07 17.36 15.74 19.03
IV-VII 60.31 64.37 63.29 65.63 63.74 62.65 64.85
VIII-X 84.58 85.37 84.92 85.96 85.08 84.58 85.62
Total 53.17 56.82 56.02 57.63 56.21 55.45 56.96
2 Husbands 0 children 93.43 93.49 93.30 93.69 93.50 93.30 93.69
1 child 94.25 94.40 94.08 94.75 94.47 94.25 94.75
2 children 93.83 93.54 92.98 93.83 93.76 93.40 94.04
3 children 88.46 88.19 86.54 89.42 88.44 87.50 89.42
I-III 84.26 84.15 83.56 84.60 84.40 84.08 84.78
IV-VII 96.76 96.80 96.50 97.15 96.86 96.63 97.15
VIII-X 98.44 98.43 98.27 98.44 98.41 98.27 98.44
Public 23.52 23.38 23.00 23.78 23.21 22.85 23.52
Private 69.99 70.11 69.68 70.51 70.38 70.04 70.77
Total 93.51 93.49 93.30 93.67 93.59 93.46 93.72
Wives 0 children 54.27 54.83 54.53 55.19 54.51 54.14 54.93
1 child 55.67 58.04 57.02 59.22 57.17 56.35 58.21
2 children 51.70 56.92 55.11 58.72 55.76 54.26 57.23
3 children 37.50 45.42 41.35 50.00 44.17 40.38 49.04
I-III 12.28 16.64 15.22 18.34 15.55 14.36 16.96
IV-VII 60.31 63.29 62.39 64.33 62.47 61.61 63.29
VIII-X 84.58 85.08 84.75 85.62 84.78 84.40 85.27
Public 20.87 21.49 21.03 21.91 21.16 20.82 21.55
Private 32.29 34.33 33.70 34.99 33.92 33.39 34.48
Total 53.17 55.82 55.14 56.44 55.07 54.52 55.66
Notes:Q5 andQ95 denote the fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles, respectively, so that (Q5,Q95) is a two sided confidence
interval of 90 percent.
and at the bottom of the disposable household income distribution. A cross-sectoral anal-
ysis of the policy effects fromModel 2 also reveals that most labor market transitions take
place in the private sector, where there is a greater availability of jobs and lower hourly
wages than the public sector.
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Table 4 Effects of EITC andWTC reforms on unconditional weekly hours of work of
husbands and wives bymodel specification, household type, decile of disposable
household income and sector
EITC WTC
Model Spouse Variable Baseline Mean Q5 Q95 Mean Q5 Q95
1 Husbands 0 children 36.95 36.97 36.85 37.11 36.94 36.82 37.07
1 child 37.04 37.09 36.86 37.34 37.00 36.79 37.23
2 children 37.23 37.17 36.89 37.40 37.09 36.86 37.31
3 children 34.90 34.81 33.89 35.53 34.79 34.09 35.38
I-III 32.40 32.49 32.20 32.81 32.43 32.21 32.64
IV-VII 38.36 38.37 38.18 38.54 38.28 38.13 38.44
VIII-X 39.58 39.47 39.36 39.57 39.45 39.33 39.56
Total 36.94 36.94 36.82 37.05 36.88 36.77 36.98
Wives 0 children 18.55 18.75 18.57 18.96 18.66 18.52 18.80
1 child 17.87 18.72 18.34 19.09 18.56 18.21 18.97
2 children 16.20 18.12 17.52 18.63 18.02 17.50 18.55
3 children 11.39 13.96 12.60 15.67 14.16 12.69 16.15
I-III 3.50 5.26 4.73 5.78 5.01 4.49 5.61
IV-VII 19.48 20.54 20.20 20.89 20.43 20.08 20.84
VIII-X 28.47 28.48 28.25 28.69 28.52 28.31 28.71
Total 17.38 18.33 18.08 18.59 18.23 17.98 18.48
2 Husbands 0 children 36.95 36.96 36.86 37.06 36.93 36.84 37.02
1 child 37.04 37.06 36.86 37.27 37.00 36.82 37.17
2 children 37.23 37.11 36.83 37.39 37.11 36.90 37.31
3 children 34.90 34.80 34.04 35.43 34.77 34.18 35.29
I-III 32.40 32.42 32.13 32.66 32.38 32.18 32.60
IV-VII 38.36 38.34 38.18 38.50 38.30 38.16 38.43
VIII-X 39.58 39.51 39.40 39.59 39.50 39.38 39.60
Public 8.84 8.79 8.65 8.94 8.72 8.59 8.84
Private 28.09 28.12 27.94 28.28 28.17 28.00 28.33
Total 36.94 36.91 36.80 37.01 36.88 36.79 36.97
Wives 0 children 18.55 18.68 18.55 18.82 18.60 18.48 18.72
1 child 17.87 18.46 18.12 18.82 18.26 17.98 18.56
2 children 16.20 17.61 17.11 18.14 17.38 16.90 17.86
3 children 11.39 13.48 12.26 15.05 13.31 12.16 14.76
I-III 3.50 4.77 4.34 5.25 4.46 4.09 4.86
IV-VII 19.48 20.26 19.94 20.55 20.08 19.84 20.38
VIII-X 28.47 28.47 28.31 28.63 28.48 28.33 28.64
Public 6.73 6.87 6.74 7.00 6.80 6.69 6.90
Private 10.65 11.20 11.00 11.40 11.11 10.95 11.29
Total 17.38 18.07 17.88 18.25 17.91 17.73 18.09
Notes:Q5 andQ95 denote the fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles, respectively, so that (Q5,Q95) is a two sided confidence
interval of 90 percent.
The redistributive effects of the EITC and WTC reforms are presented in Table 5.
For both reforms, we find a positive effect on DHI of about 1%, a sizeable reduction in
the number of poor households (3.14 percentage points under the EITC and 3.86 per-
centage points under the WTC), and a small improvement in the living standards of
those who remain poor. Furthermore, as for labor supply effects, the magnitude of these
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Table 5 Redistributive effects of EITC andWTC reforms bymodel specification and
household type
EITC WTC
Model Outcome Household type Baseline Mean Q5 Q95 Mean Q5 Q95
1 DHI 0 children 31.83 32.29 32.20 32.40 32.27 32.19 32.35
1 child 29.56 31.33 31.15 31.50 31.39 31.22 31.56
2 children 28.85 31.72 31.43 31.98 31.84 31.58 32.08
3 children 25.92 28.87 28.17 29.65 29.24 28.60 29.93
Total 30.09 31.67 31.55 31.77 31.73 31.61 31.84
HCR 0 children 6.57 3.87 3.68 4.07 3.79 3.55 4.07
1 child 15.40 9.78 9.31 10.32 8.91 8.46 9.31
2 children 27.45 19.31 18.30 20.43 18.33 17.23 19.36
3 children 52.88 41.18 37.50 44.23 40.88 36.54 44.23
Total 16.87 11.47 11.11 11.84 10.91 10.54 11.27
PGR 0 children 2.19 1.76 1.69 1.89 1.71 1.61 1.77
1 child 4.29 3.91 3.67 4.21 3.61 3.42 3.78
2 children 7.19 6.50 6.15 6.97 5.96 5.73 6.21
3 children 16.47 15.59 14.37 16.99 14.10 13.28 14.91
Total 4.83 4.33 4.16 4.48 4.00 3.91 4.09
2 DHI 0 children 31.83 30.91 30.85 30.98 30.90 30.84 30.97
1 child 29.56 30.21 30.04 30.36 30.27 30.14 30.39
2 children 28.85 30.58 30.33 30.83 30.67 30.45 30.89
3 children 25.92 27.58 26.98 28.24 27.82 27.33 28.43
Total 30.09 30.44 30.34 30.52 30.49 30.41 30.56
HCR 0 children 6.57 4.05 3.94 4.20 4.11 3.94 4.34
1 child 15.40 11.93 11.34 12.52 10.75 10.32 11.34
2 children 27.45 23.89 22.77 25.11 22.37 21.49 23.40
3 children 52.88 48.94 44.23 51.92 48.58 44.23 51.92
Total 16.87 13.73 13.29 14.12 13.01 12.67 13.34
PGR 0 children 2.19 1.89 1.84 2.01 1.84 1.75 1.90
1 child 4.29 4.31 4.05 4.60 3.95 3.76 4.13
2 children 7.19 7.07 6.67 7.55 6.44 6.23 6.73
3 children 16.47 17.24 16.08 18.49 15.86 15.13 16.59
Total 4.83 4.73 4.59 4.90 4.37 4.27 4.47
Notes: DHI denotes disposable household income in 1000 Euros, HCR denotes the poverty head count ratio, and PGR
denotes the poverty gap ratio.Q5 andQ95 denote the fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles, respectively, so that (Q5,Q95) is a
two sided confidence interval of 90 percent.
redistributive effects is typically increasing with household size. Overall, these simula-
tion results reveal that the new in-work benefits more than compensate the negative
impact on equity due to the abolition of FA, and thus the proposed policy reforms
would improve the existing welfare system in terms of both incentive and redistributive
effects.
Table 6 presents the PP of wives, the HCR and the PGR resulting from our sensitivity
analysis on the benefit premium for two-earner households. For the simulation designs
with pc = 0, which correspond to the standard EITC andWTC programs with no benefit
premium for two-earner households, we find a reduction of about 1 percentage point in
the PP of wives and a strong improvement of the two poverty indicators. The effects on
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Table 6 Sensitivity analysis on the benefit premium for two-earner households
(Model 2 only)
PP - Wives HCR PGR
Policy pc Mean Q5 Q95 Mean Q5 Q95 Mean Q5 Q95
Baseline 53.17 16.87 4.83
EITC 0 52.17 51.71 52.60 12.38 12.10 12.67 4.25 4.18 4.33
0.50 54.38 53.95 54.83 13.29 12.98 13.60 4.44 4.35 4.55
1.00 55.82 55.14 56.44 13.73 13.29 14.12 4.73 4.59 4.90
1.50 56.47 55.76 57.27 13.88 13.34 14.33 4.95 4.75 5.16
WTC 0 52.41 51.97 52.80 12.32 12.05 12.62 4.19 4.10 4.27
0.50 53.81 53.43 54.26 12.70 12.41 12.98 4.26 4.18 4.33
1.00 55.07 54.52 55.66 13.01 12.67 13.34 4.37 4.27 4.47
1.50 56.08 55.40 56.85 13.25 12.77 13.66 4.49 4.35 4.63
Notes: pc is the benefit premium for two-earner households.Q5 andQ95 denote the fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles,
respectively, so that (Q5,Q95) is a two sided confidence interval of 90 percent.
employment of wives is positive only for simulation designs with pc > 0. However, as pc
increases, we also see a clear trade-off between efficiency and equity.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have provided an ex-ante evaluation on labor supply and redistributive
effects of EITC andWTC in-work benefits for Italian married couples using a tax-benefit
microsimulation model and a structural model of labor supply. The innovative feature of
our policy reforms is that we have augmented the standard design of EITC and WTC in-
work benefits with a new benefit premium for two-earner households to overcome the
potential disincentive effects that these family-based schemes typically generate on sec-
ondary earners. Unlike the usual dichotomization between family and individual-based
in-work benefits, this policy design provides a smooth mechanism for handing the well-
known trade-off between labor supply and redistributive effects within a single welfare
instrument.
Our revenue neutral simulations show that in-work benefits with a suitable scheme
of incentives for secondary earners may greatly improve the current Italian tax-benefit
system in terms of both incentive and redistributive effects. The EITC is more effective
than the WTC in boosting employment, while the WTC is more effective than the EITC
in fighting poverty. In both schemes, the trade-off between incentive and redistributive
effects depends crucially on the size of new benefit premium for two-earner households.
Whether this trade-off can be formalized as a problem of optimal mechanism design is a
interesting research topic which is left to future work.
Endnotes
1For additional details on the EITC see http://www.irs.gov/publications/p596.
2For additional details on the WTC see http://www.litrg.org.uk/low-income-workers/
tax-credits.
3The HCR is defined by the proportion of households with disposable income below
the poverty line, while the PGR is defined by the means gap between the poverty line and
disposable household income as a proportion of the poverty line by counting the
non-poor as having a zero poverty gap.
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Appendix A: Amulti-sector model of labor supply for married couples
We consider a unitary framework in which husband and wife maximize a common
household utility function of the form
U = V (lm, lf , y) + (s, k),
where V (lm, lf , y) is a systematic component, lm is the husband’s leisure, lf is the wife’s
leisure, y is disposable household income, (s, k) is a positive random taste-shifter, and
s = (sm, sf ) and k = (km, kf ) index, respectively, the sector combination and the combi-
nation of jobs for the husband and the wife. The error (s, k) is assumed to be i.i.d. across
households, sectors and jobs with c.d.f. Pr{ < x} = exp(− exp(−1/x)), for real x. The
budget constraint of the couple is y = ψ (hm ωm(sm), hf ωf (sf ); I), where hm and hf are
the hours of work of the husband and the wife, ωm(sm) and ωf (sf ) are their sector-specific
hourly wages, I is non-labor household income, and ψ is a tax-benefit function. Provided
that the utility is increasing in y, we obtain
U = ν(zm, zf ; I) + (s, k),
where zi = (hi, si), i = m, f , and ν(zm, zf ; I) = V
(
lm, lf , ψ(hm ωm(sm), hf ωf (sf ); I)
)
.
The choice sets of jobs offered to the husband and the wife are assumed to be indepen-
dent from each other, and each of them consists of a finite number of alternatives. The
hours of work of each job are fixed, but there can be several job opportunities with the
same working requirements that differ because of other nonpecuniary characteristics.
Since the size of the choice sets is unknown to the researcher, we denote by Q(zm, zf )
the set of job pairs with hours of work (hm, hf ) in sectors (sm, sf ) and by qi(zi) the number
of jobs available to spouse i = m, f with hours of work hi in sector si. It follows that the
probability of selecting a specific job pair k = (km, kf )with characteristics (zm, zf ) is equal
to the sum of the selection probabilities for all jobs in Q(zm, zf ) with the same observable
characteristics. Thus, for job pairs with hm > 0 and hf > 0, we obtain
π(zm, zf ) =
ν(zm, zf ; I) qm(zm) qf (zf )
P ,
(1)
where P is a normalization constant of the form
P = ν(0, 0, 0, 0; I) +
∑
xm>0
∑
sm
ν(xm, sm, 0, 0; I) qm(xm, sm) +
∑
xf >0
∑
sf
ν(0, 0, xf , sf ; I) qf (xf , sf )
+
∑
xm>0
∑
xf >0
∑
sm
∑
sf
ν(xm, sm, xf , sf ; I) qm(xm, sm) qf (xf , sf ).
The choice probabilities of the other job pairs have a similar form.
Following Dagsvik and Strøm S (2006), we can also re-parameterize the number of avail-
able jobs to foster interpretation. Let qi(zi) = θi(si) gi(zi) with θi(si) = ∑xi>0 qi(xi, si) for
alternatives with hi > 0 and θi(si) = gi(zi) = 1 for alternatives with hi = 0. It follows
that θi(si) measures the number of job opportunities relative to nonworking opportuni-
ties that are available to spouse i in sector si, whereas gi(zi) measures the share of jobs
with hi hours of work that are available to spouse i in sector si.
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Appendix B: Estimation of sector-specific hourly wage equations of husbands
and wives
Let j1 and j2 be two indicators for the sectors of husband and wife, respectively, with js = 0
denoting non-participation, js = 1 public sector, and js = 2 private sector (s = 1, 2).
Ignoring endogenity problems, our system of hourly wage equations can be written as
lnw1 = X1 β1 + η1 if j1 = 1, (Husband - Public)
lnw2 = X2 β2 + η2 if j2 = 1, (Wife - Public)
lnw3 = X3 β3 + η3 if j1 = 2, (Husband - Private)
lnw4 = X4 β4 + η4 if j2 = 2, (Wife - Private)
(2)
where Xt (t = 1, . . . , 4) are vectors of exogenous variables, βt are the associated vec-
tors of parameters, and ηt are error terms with E(ηt|Xt) = 0, Var(ηt|Xt) = σ 2t , and
Cov(ηt , ηq|Xt ,Xq) = σtq (t = q). As pointed out by Maddala (1983) in the context
of switching regression models, the covariances σ13 and σ24 are not estimable because
sector-specific hourly wages of the same agent can never be observed simultaneously.
Hence, there is no loss of generality in setting these two parameters to zero. The remain-
ing covariances can be identified from the subsamples where hourly wages of the husband
and the wife are both observed. In general, however, for consistent estimation one needs
to model the selection mechanisms of the two spouses jointly. Hence, we assume that
utility of a couple in the sector combination (j1, j2) is
U∗j1j2 = Zγj1j2 + j1j2 ,
where Z is a vector of exogenous variables, γj1j2 are vectors of parameters, and j1j2
are i.i.d. errors independent of Z with a type-I extreme value distribution. Under this
distributional assumption, selection probabilities have the standard multinomial logit
form
Pj1j2 = P
(
U∗j1j2 = maxk1,k2 U
∗
k1k2
)
= exp
(
Zγj1j2
)
∑
k1,k2 exp
(
Zγk1k2
) , (3)
with k1, k2 = 0, 1, 2. To model sample selection, we allow the errors in the outcome
equations of interest to be correlated with the errors in themultinomial selection equation
on the basis of
E(η1|00, . . . , 22) = σ1
√
6
π
∑
k2
r1.1k2 ∗1k2 ,
E(η2|00, . . . , 22) = σ2
√
6
π
∑
k1
r2.k11 ∗k11,
E(η3|00, . . . , 22) = σ3
√
6
π
∑
k2
r3.2k2 ∗2k2 ,
E(η4|00, . . . , 22) = σ4
√
6
π
∑
k1
r4.k12 ∗k12,
(4)
where ∗k1k2 = k1k2 − E(k1k2) and rt.k1k2 denote the correlation coefficient between ηt
and k1k2 . Provided that the model is correctly specified, all identifiable parameters in
(2)–(4) can be estimated consistently by the two-step procedure of De Luca (2014), which
extends to SURE models the approach of Durbin and McFadden (1984) for consistent
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estimation of a single outcome equation with amultinomial selection rule. Let us consider
for simplicity the first equation of (4). The results in De Luca (2014) imply that
E(η1|j1 = 1) = σ1
√
6
π
∑
k2
r1.1k21.1k2 , (5)
where 1.1k2 are the bias correction terms of the form,
1.1k2 =
{
P−11. (P1. − P1k2 )λ1k2 − P−11. P1k2 lnP1k2 if k1 = 1,
λ1k2 if k1 = 1,
with P1. = ∑k2 P1k2 and λ1k2 = (1 − P1k2)−1P1k2 lnP1k2 . Thus, β1 and the coefficients on
the bias correction terms can be estimated consistently by OLS on the basis of
lnw1 = X1 β1 + σ1
√
6
π
∑
k2
r1.1k21.1k2 + u1, if j1 = 1 (6)
where E(u1|j1 = 1) = 0. A consistent estimate of σ1 can be also recovered from
Var(u1|j1 = 1) = σ 21 (1 + 1), (7)
where
1 = 6
π2
∑
k2
r21.1k2
(
1.1k2 −
λ21k2
P1k2
)
,
with
1.1k2 =
λ21k2
P1.
+ P1k2P1. (lnP1k2)
2 +
(
1 − P1k2P1.
)
λ21k2 −
(
1 − 1P1.
)2
λ21k2 .
Moreover, if u2 denotes the error in the augmented regression model for the second
equation of the system, then a consistent estimate of σ12 can be recovered from
E(u1u2|j1 = 1, j2 = 1) = σ12 + σ1σ2 6
π2
∗1∗2 (8)
where ∗1 =
∑
k2 r1.1k21.1k2 and 
∗
2 =
∑
k1 r2.k112.k11.
Results for the other equations of the system can be obtained in a similar fashion. In
addition, this setup can be easily extended to account for endogeneity problems by incor-
porating in (6) residual terms from reduced form equations for the endogenous variables
(see, for example, Das et al. 2003).
Our control function procedure then consists of three steps. In the first step, we esti-
mate reduced form equations for experience of each spouse. In the second step, we
estimate the multinomial logit model in (3) and compute consistent estimates of the bias
correction terms in (6)–(8). In the third step, we estimate augmented regression models
like (6) by OLS, including as additional regressors reduced form residuals from the first
step and bias correction terms from the second step. Consistent estimates of the variances
σ 2t are obtained from (7) using the sum of squared residuals over the subsample where
each wage equation is observed, while consistent estimates of the identifiable covari-
ances σtq are obtained from (8) using the sum of cross-products of the residuals over the
subsamples where two wage equations are both observed. Standard errors of the third-
step estimates are computed by nonparametric bootstrap. The third-step estimates of our
system of hourly wage equations are presented in Table 7.
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Table 7 Log hourly wages estimates of husband and wife
Model 1 Model 2
Conditional mean Public sector Private sector
Husband Wife Husband Wife Husband Wife
Experience 0.0150** 0.0308** 0.0156** 0.0259** 0.0123** 0.0201**
Experience2 -0.0003* -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0006* -0.0004* -0.0002
Experience3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Secondary educ. 0.2658** 0.2028** 0.2569** 0.3157** 0.2368** 0.1156*
Tertiary educ. 0.7077** 0.6050** 0.7807** 0.6442** 0.5672** 0.4309**
Reg unemployment -0.0188** 0.0168 0.0111 0.0166 -0.0404** -0.0138
Center 0.0614* 0.109* 0.0051 0.1306* 0.0932** 0.1266*
South 0.028 0.0296 -0.1475 0.0255 0.1075 0.0564
1.11 -0.2700 0.0084
1.12 -0.0224 -0.0377
1.13 0.1166
2.21 -0.3833 -0.0857
2.22 0.0099 -0.0249
2.23 0.0276
3.31 0.0201
3.32 0.6129**
3.33 -0.5029*
4.41 -0.0658
4.42 0.2022
4.43 -0.0629
ωˆ -0.0143** -0.0272** -0.0205** -0.0248** -0.0074* -0.0166
ωˆ2 -0.0011* -0.0009** -0.0022** -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0009*
ωˆ3 -0.0001** 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001* -0.0000 0.0000
Constant 2.3001** 2.0488** 2.2215** 2.0816** 2.3909 2.2094**
Variance matrix Public sector Private sector
Husband Wife Husband Wife Husband Wife
Husband 0.3926** 0.0466**
Wife 0.4175**
Public Husband 0.3437** 0.0414** -0.0004
Wife 0.3551** 0.0284**
Private Husband 0.3063** 0.0527**
Wife 0.4318**
Notes:t.k1k2 are bias correction terms for sample selection. ωˆ are residuals from reduced form equations for experience of
each spouse. Standard errors are computed using 500 nonparametric bootstrap replications. Asterisks * denote a p-value
between 5% and 1%, and ** a p-value below 1%.
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